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Thread: Ινδιάνοι στο Σάλτσμπουργκ και η χώρα των σκατάδ

  1. #21

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    Έγινε η σχετική υπόδειξη και μπήκε link στην αρχική δημοσίευση...

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    Δηλαδή?
    "Θαυμάζω την κομψότητα της μεθόδου σας. Πρέπει να είναι ωραίο να καλπάζεις με το άλογο των αληθινών Μαθηματικών, ενώ εμείς οι υπόλοιποι αγκομαχάμε στον ποδαρόδρομο" - ο Άλμπερτ Άινσταϊν στον Τούλλιο Λέβι-Τσίβιτα

  3. #23

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    Δηλαδή, αν κάνεις κλικ στο link που έχει στην αρχή του κειμένου (ο τίτλος με τα πράσινα γράμματα) έρχεσαι εδώ...

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    Thanks, αλλά δεν χρειαζόταν να παρέμβεις (εάν παρενέβης). Τουλάχιστον από τη δική μου μεριά. Εάν το έκανες για λογαριασμό του avmentor, τότε πάω πάσσο. Έτσι κι αλλιώς αυτή η προσθήκη (του λινκ, με τον τρόπο που γίνεται) είναι παραπλανητική. Δεν κάνει το εν λόγω άτομο (που συνεχίζει να διατηρεί την υπογραφή του κάτω από το κείμενο) λιγότερο λογοκλόπο, απλώς προσθέτει στην ιδιότητα του λογοκλόπου και εκείνην του πονηρίδη. Par for the course για έναν ΑΡΔ δηλαδή.
    "Θαυμάζω την κομψότητα της μεθόδου σας. Πρέπει να είναι ωραίο να καλπάζεις με το άλογο των αληθινών Μαθηματικών, ενώ εμείς οι υπόλοιποι αγκομαχάμε στον ποδαρόδρομο" - ο Άλμπερτ Άινσταϊν στον Τούλλιο Λέβι-Τσίβιτα

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    Quote Originally Posted by zonepress View Post
    Το κατά κεφαλήν εισόδημα της Βενεζουέλας είναι το μισό από της χώρας των σκατάδων, που επί πλέον έχει χρεωκοπήσει.
    Ας δούμε δύο ματιές πάνω στο θέμα, από τον διεθνή τύπο:
    http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion...x-1899559.html
    John Lichfield: A lesson, son, in crisis and paradox
    Why did the banks go after the poor Greeks, Daddy?
    Good question ...
    Daddy, Daddy, who are the "financial markets" who are bullying the Greeks and the euro?
    Well, son, they are hedge funds, pension funds and the trading arms of the big banks.
    But Daddy aren't those the same banks which the world's governments have just spent billions of euros, pounds and dollars to rescue from the consequences of their own greed and stupidity?
    Er, yes son.
    And, Daddy, aren't those banks now betting those same billions to try to make money from the fact that some of the governments are over the heads in debt?
    Er, yes son.
    And these countries, including Greece, would not have been so deeply in the red if they had not given all those billions to the banks who are now attacking them? Or if the world economy had not been dumped off a cliff by all that bank-inspired debt and bank-led speculation in bad debts?
    Well, son, yes, that's partly true but some countries, especially Greece, have been living beyond their public means for years. In Greece, for instance, lawyers, doctors, restaurant owners and wealthy ship-owners, pay virtually no income tax but expect to live in a properly functioning, modern state.
    OK, Daddy, I understand that. It's very naughty of them. But isn't this still a case of the banks biting the hand that fed them?
    Er, no, son, it's worse that that. It's like the banks complaining that governments are naked after taking their clothes. But the markets (i.e. banks) don't think that way. If they smell blood, they pile in like hyenas after a limping zebra. It's called a market opportunity.
    But why did they suddenly go after the poor Greeks, Daddy? Haven't their olives been stuffed for years?
    Yes, son, but the markets noticed two things. First, that a new Greek government had confessed that the country's budget deficit last year was 12.7 per cent of GDP double the number the previous government had thought of. It probably wasn't that high actually. The new government in Athens reckoned that it would be a good wheeze to inflate the number so that they could gain credit for bringing it down rapidly in 2010. It is called a mythical Greek figure. Mythical or not, it was enough for the markets to smell blood or money.
    And the second thing that the markets noticed, Daddy?
    I was coming to that, son. They noticed that Greece no longer had a currency of its own. It was a member of the euro. It could not devalue or print money. Worse, under the rules of the euro, the European Central Bank could not intervene to help a member state in difficulties. It was as if Greece and other euro countries with big debts, like Spain, Portugal and Italy had no central bank to help them through a crisis.
    So what did the "financial markets" do, Daddy?
    They started a gambling game in which they bet on a possible Greek "default": that Greece would go bankrupt and not be able to pay its debts. By doing so, they made it more likely that Greece would go bankrupt by increasing the cost to Athens of rolling over (ie finding new takers for) its 300bn in accumulated debts. In other words, it was, for "the markets", a one-way, no-lose bet unless the EU intervened.
    So what happened, Daddy?
    The EU made a statement last Thursday that it would stand shoulder to shoulder with Greece ... but not yet. If the markets continued to bet on Greek default, the EU leaders said, they would lose because the other euro members would find some way of bending their collective rules to give Greece money. In return, Greece had to agree to painful changes to reduce its budget deficit by at least four per cent this year.
    But, Daddy, that will be quite easy for the Greeks because the 12.7 per cent figure for 2009 was exaggerated in the first place.
    Er, yes, son, but "the markets" chose to accept that figure so they are now stuck with it. We are talking about "market reality" which is not the same thing as real reality. And, in fact, the new Greek government is taking, by Greek standards, very tough measures, including a plan to make lawyers and doctors and restaurant-owners pay some income tax.
    But Daddy, why did the EU not just give the Greeks the money and tell the markets to ...
    Shh, son, no rude words. That's where we come to another kind of reality "political reality". The other EU governments, especially the stern Germans, wanted to make sure that Athens would start to take its medicine before they gave them any sweeties. Remember Aesop's fable about the ants and the grasshoppers, son? Well Aesop was an ancient Greek but, according to the Germans, the modern Greeks are grasshoppers.
    Is that all, Daddy?
    No, son. The "crisis" was pushing down the value of the euro against the dollar, which was something the Germans and others rather liked because it would help their economies. Like the sinner who wanted to be good but not yet, they wanted the Greek crisis to end but not immediately.
    Isn't that a dangerous game, Daddy?
    Yes, son.
    So what happened?
    It's still a bit unclear. The "markets" thousands of people playing poker at the same time are still trying to see how best to make money from the new situation. Should they carry on betting on Greek default? Or should they now bet on everything being OK?
    Is this a sensible way to run the world, Daddy?
    No, son, but consider this. The crisis has scared the Greeks. They may now finally put their house in order which will, in the long run, be good for the Greeks. The crisis, which is a Greek word, son, has also scared the EU, even the stern Germans. The original rules of the euro good rules for good times but bad rules for bad times will probably be changed. Something will be done to permit the EU to help struggling states, so that, in future, the markets will not smell blood and worsen the problems of stragglers.
    So good can come from bad? What do you call that, Daddy?
    A "paradox", son.
    Is that also a Greek word?
    Yes, son, now go to bed.
    "Θαυμάζω την κομψότητα της μεθόδου σας. Πρέπει να είναι ωραίο να καλπάζεις με το άλογο των αληθινών Μαθηματικών, ενώ εμείς οι υπόλοιποι αγκομαχάμε στον ποδαρόδρομο" - ο Άλμπερτ Άινσταϊν στον Τούλλιο Λέβι-Τσίβιτα

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    http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b8e66a6-1...44feab49a.html
    Europe cannot afford to rescue Greece
    by Otmar Issing
    To bail out Greece or not? The question is grabbing headlines daily. Supporters of a bail-out argue that if Greece collapses, others would follow. Financial markets have already identified the next candidates. As such, European economic and monetary union is at risk. Only financial aid and solidarity with highly indebted members can rescue the euro.
    It is certainly true that this is a decisive moment for Emu but for the opposite reason. Greece will continue to receive support from several European Union funds. But financial aid from other EU countries or institutions that amounted, directly or indirectly, to a bail-out would violate EU treaties and undermine the foundations of Emu. Such principles do not allow for compromise. Once Greece was helped, the dam would be broken. A bail-out for the country that broke the rules would make it impossible to deny aid to others.
    It seems that quite a number of observers have forgotten what Emu is, and what it is not. The monetary union is based on two pillars. One is the stability of the euro, guaranteed by an independent central bank with a clear mandate to maintain price stability. The other is fiscal solidity, which has to be delivered by individual member states. Member countries are still sovereign. Emu does not represent a state; it is an institutional arrangement unique in history.
    In the 1990s, many economists I was among them warned that starting monetary union without having established a political union was putting the cart before the horse. Now the question is whether monetary union can survive without such a political union. The current crisis must be handled in such a way as to produce a positive answer. The viability of the whole framework nothing less is at stake.
    By joining Emu, a country accepts its rules. Greece, moreover, also knew that adopting a stable currency that was not controlled by its own central bank implied a total break with the past. Devaluation of the national currency and an inflationary monetary policy were no longer options. A single monetary policy is implemented by the European Central Bank and it is the responsibility of each country to adjust its economic policies so that this one size fits all.
    Participation in Emu brings huge advantages. The benefits of joining a stable economic area are greatest for countries that were unable to deliver such conditions before. Thanks to the euro, Greece has enjoyed long-term interest rates at a record low. But instead of delivering on its commitment at the time of entry to reduce public debt levels, the country has wasted potential savings in a spending frenzy. The crisis with which it is now confronted is not the result of an external shock such as an earthquake, but the result of bad policies pursued over many years. Bailing out Greece would reward such behaviour and create moral hazard of a dimension hardly seen before.
    In this context, one conclusion becomes obvious: financial assistance for countries that violated the terms of their participation in Emu would be a major blow for the credibility of the whole framework. By its construction, Emu is a no transfers community of sovereign states. Transferring taxpayers money from countries that obeyed the rules to those that violated them would create hostility towards Brussels and between euro area countries. Among ordinary people, it would undermine a badly needed sense of identification with the great project of European integration.
    This moment is a turning point for Emu, and for the future of Europe. Most observers point to the high risks which cannot be denied. However, any crisis also presents an opportunity. This is a big chance probably the last for Greece, and others to adapt fully to a regime of stable money and solid public finances.
    For Emu, the crisis represents a final test of whether such an institutional arrangement a monetary union without a political union is viable for an extended period of time. Lax monitoring and compromises when it comes to observing implementation of rules have to stop. Emu is a club of states with firm rules accepted by entrants. These rules must not be changed ex-post. Governments should not forget what they promised their citizens when they gave up their national currencies.

    The writer is president of the Centre for Financial Studies and a former member of the European Central Banks executive board
    Published: February 15 2010 14:18
    Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010.


    Ο στρατός κατοχής της Ελλάδος, οι δημόσιοι υπάλληλοι και οι ισόβιοι συνδικαλιστές, διαφωνούν με όλα αυτά. Διότι αυτοί ξέρουν καλύτερα. Το ερώτημα είναι αν ξέρουμε και εμείς οι υπόλοιποι κάτι άλλο - και πώς θα το εκφράσουμε
    "Θαυμάζω την κομψότητα της μεθόδου σας. Πρέπει να είναι ωραίο να καλπάζεις με το άλογο των αληθινών Μαθηματικών, ενώ εμείς οι υπόλοιποι αγκομαχάμε στον ποδαρόδρομο" - ο Άλμπερτ Άινσταϊν στον Τούλλιο Λέβι-Τσίβιτα

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    Οι καημοί της Ρωμιοσύνης:
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8a3AzMtCTeI
    "Θαυμάζω την κομψότητα της μεθόδου σας. Πρέπει να είναι ωραίο να καλπάζεις με το άλογο των αληθινών Μαθηματικών, ενώ εμείς οι υπόλοιποι αγκομαχάμε στον ποδαρόδρομο" - ο Άλμπερτ Άινσταϊν στον Τούλλιο Λέβι-Τσίβιτα

  8. #28

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    Το ερώτημα είναι αν ξέρουμε και εμείς οι υπόλοιποι κάτι άλλο - και πώς θα το εκφράσουμε (...)
    Έχεις καμμιά εφαρμόσιμη πρόταση; Γιατί εγώ δεν μπορώ να σκεφτώ κάτι χρήσιμο... Μόνο τη μετανάστευση.

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    Πρόταση έχω, εφαρμόσιμη δεν ξέρω αν είναι. Ακόμα. Πρέπει να δημιουργηθεί ένα κίνημα πολιτών, όπου ο καθένας που θα συμμετέχει θα δωρίζει ένα σεβαστό ποσό (π.χ. 2000 ευρώ) εφ' άπαξ στο κράτος, με αντάλλαγμα να απολύεται (όχι να συνταξιοδοτείται, όχι να εθελουσιοαποτέτοιο, να απολύεται) ένας δημόσιος υπάλληλος
    Το προσωπικό service θα χρεώνεται εξτρά, π.χ. εάν πληρώσεις 4000 ευρώ, θα έχεις δικαίωμα να ορίζεις ποιός δημόσιος υπάλληλος θα απολυθεί
    "Θαυμάζω την κομψότητα της μεθόδου σας. Πρέπει να είναι ωραίο να καλπάζεις με το άλογο των αληθινών Μαθηματικών, ενώ εμείς οι υπόλοιποι αγκομαχάμε στον ποδαρόδρομο" - ο Άλμπερτ Άινσταϊν στον Τούλλιο Λέβι-Τσίβιτα

  10. #30

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    Γι' αυτό είπα εφαρμόσιμη...
    Αυτό που περιγράφεις προϋποθέτει συνεργασία του κράτους. Και, δυστυχώς, "κράτος" στην Ελλάδα είναι μια σειρά από κοινωνικές ομάδες που ανήκουν σε αυτό επιτυχημένα χαρακτήρισες "στρατό κατοχής" (απλώς ξέχασες νε περιλάβεις τα κάθε λογής μέλη συντεχνιών, ειδικών ομάδων, -ούχων, -παθών και άλλων που ασχολούνται με την άκοπη απομύζηση πόρων). Όλοι αυτοί δεν θα δεχτούν μια ένωση πολιτών με τέτοια κριτήρια. Εδώ δεν δέχονται να φορολογηθούν όπως οι υπόλοιποι...

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